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Small unmanned aerial systems (UAS), more commonly known as ‘drones,’ 
are an increasing security risk to fixed facilities due to their ease of use, high 
performance, and increasing prevalence. Prison systems have experienced incidents 
where drones were used to introduce contraband, such as cell phones, drugs, and 
weapons (Harvey, 2018; Otte, 2017). In December 2018, drones disrupted flights 
for an estimated 110,000 people over several days at London’s Gatwick Airport 
(“Drones Ground Flights at Gatwick,” 2018). Systems to counter UAS  are rapidly 
being developed but are often unattainable by a majority of organizations due to 
high cost, liability concerns, and regulatory restrictions.  
The FAA Reauthorization Act of 2018 defines counter unmanned aerial 
system (C-UAS) technology as “a system or device capable of lawfully and safely 
disabling, disrupting or seizing control of an unmanned aircraft or unmanned 
aircraft system” (p. 100). For this paper, C-UAS will include active measures to 
detect and interdict unwanted UAS traffic by a facility or entity. While geofencing 
has proven beneficial in deterring casual drone users from overflying restricted or 
otherwise sensitive areas, it is largely dependent on the drone manufacturer to 
implement and may be easily disabled by the user. Since the protected facilities 
have no active control over geofencing it will not be considered a C-UAS.  
Industry regulatory standards for C-UAS are in the process of being 
developed but are not yet implemented. Several governing bodies have been 
identified to develop technical standards within this field. A multitude of legal 
issues exist that prevent public and private organizations from conducting C-UAS 
operations due, largely, to a broad application of the term “aircraft” and subsequent 
measures to protect manned aviation. Currently, few Federal agencies are legally 
permitted to use C-UAS technology within the United States within the constraints 
outlined in Public Law. This paper serves as a collective summary of the current 
state of C-UAS policy within the U.S. and highlights the current lack of industry 
standards and identifies major efforts to develop these standards.  
 
Industry Regulatory Standards of C-UAS 
As of December of 2019, the Counter-Drone Systems report highlighted 
that there are 537 C-UAS products and systems offered by over 277 different 
companies (Michel, 2019). It was noted that not a single manufacturer consulted in 
preparing the report was able or willing to provide operational or test data 
associated with their systems. This resultant C-UAS environment is one where 
manufacturers may publish performance specifications that are not established 
under a testing standard. From a consumer standpoint, this is concerning because 
manufacturer marketing claims may not match the operational performance of a 
system. In addition to this, many of the technical standards for drone technology 
are currently under development, making C-UAS more difficult to implement 
against the wide variety of methods being used by drone manufacturers (McCabe, 
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2020). Standardization of these technical aspects is one step toward the reliable 
performance that will help C-UAS become available outside of the Federal 
government. 
Before a manufacturer sells a product within a market, the manufacturer 
must first determine if the product category is subject to any regulations or related 
industry standards. Regulations may require that a product adheres to certain 
technical specifications or testing standards (Standards Portal, 2020). Generally, 
these regulations are designed to protect the consumer. For example, a consumer 
purchasing gasoline that is not produced in accordance with approved 
specifications or standards could encounter costly vehicle repairs. Failing to adhere 
to the applicable laws and standards may result in manufacturers being subject to 
market denial, fines, imprisonment, or other penalties (Standards Portal, 2020). 
Governments rely on regulations and technical standards specifications generally 
established by professional bodies or standards organizations to ensure products 
follow industry best practices. Currently, no standards or regulations exist for C-
UAS technology. 
Standards Organizations 
Several major standard-setting organizations within the U.S. oversee the 
development of standards within their respective areas of expertise. Examples of 
this include NSF International, which develops standards related to public health 
and safety, and the Society of Automotive Engineers International, who develop 
technical standards for self-propelled vehicles (Standards Developing 
Organizations, 2020). The American National Standards Institute (ANSI) is a non-
profit standards organization that is made up of government, industry, and 
professional, technical, and trade societies. ANSI manages the establishment and 
implementation of thousands of standards across virtually all sectors of the 
economy (Grainger, 2020). ASTM International (formerly the American Society 
for Testing and Materials) serves similarly to ANSI and develops voluntary 
consensus standards for products, materials, systems, and services (Grainger, 
2020). 
Lack of C-UAS Technical Standards 
 In September 2017, ANSI stood up the Unmanned Aircraft Systems 
Standardization Collaborative (UASSC) in collaboration with the Federal Aviation 
Administration (FAA), the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), ASTM, and 
others, to help research and guide public policy and guidelines concerning the 
rapidly expanding UAS ecosystem (ANSI UASSC, 2020). The UASSC established 
a standardization roadmap to identify experts and stakeholders within facets of the 
UAS ecosystem and to guide efforts for standardization. The document 
acknowledges that “A comprehensive evaluation template for testing C-UAS 
systems is needed,” and that “standards must be developed for user identification, 
design, performance, safety, and operations”(McCabe, 2020, p. 377). McCabe 
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further reports that there is a general lack of standards within the C-UAS industry, 
noting a significant variance of effectiveness and reliability of these systems. 
“Detection and mitigation of unmanned aerial threats” was listed as a high priority, 
and noted that standards in-development are not generally known to the public, due 
to the sensitive nature of C-UAS implementation for entities entitled to mitigate 
UAS threats (McCabe, 2020). The USAAC has a comprehensive list of UAS 
related standards that are currently in development to meet the rapidly growing 
presence of UAS within the U.S. 
 
Legal Issues Preventing C-UAS Implementation 
Federal law prevents organizations from using C-UAS other than a few 
select federal agencies, such as the Department of Defense (DoD), the Department 
of Energy (DOE), the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and the 
Department of Justice (DOJ). These specific use cases will be discussed in a later 
section. To better understand these legal concerns, it is important for one to know 
some of the current detection and interdiction methods. Generally, C-UAS systems 
work by identifying and potentially tracking an intrusive UAS with sensors 
designed to detect some characteristic of the UAS. Methods for detecting and 
tracking include radar, acoustic, electro-optical, radio-frequency, and infrared. 
Often two or more of these detection methods are used. For example, a coarse 
bearing and location can be used from a network of acoustic sensors to cue a fine-
detect electro-optical sensor on to the target for classification and processing 
(Siewert et al., 2019). 
Interdiction methods involve means to subdue, divert, or destroy an 
intrusive UAS and can be accomplished through a myriad of means. Table 1 
represents a summary of some of the more popular methods employed to interdict 
a UAS. To successfully mitigate an unwanted UAS threat, a drone must first be 
detected by sensors, then interdicted by one of the methods discussed in Table 1. 
Many laws are currently in place that would prevent individuals and organizations 
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Types of Interdiction Methods Currently Employed 
Sensor Type Description 
Radio Frequency 
(RF) Jamming 
Interrupts the RF link between UAV and operator by 
generating large amounts of RF output. Once the RF link is 
disturbed, the UAV will land or return to the operator 
GNSS Jamming 
Interrupts the satellite link used for navigating. Once the 
satellite link is lost, UAV will hover or land 
Spoof 
Taking control of the UAV by hijacking the communications 
link 
Kinetic 
Destroys portions of the airframe with directed energy, 
causing a crash        
Net Entangles the UAV or its rotors 
Projectile Employs ammunition to destroy UAV 
Combination 
Several C-UAS methods employed – commonly tandem RF 
and GNSS jamming 
Note. Descriptions are adapted from Michel (2018, p. 4) 
 
 The following represents several of the categories that carry legal 
implications for the use of C-UAS technology. 
Federal Communications Commission (FCC) 
The FCC is an independent Federal regulatory agency that regulates 
domestic and international communications within the U.S. and is the primary 
authority for communication law and regulation. The FCC is responsible for Title 
47 of the Combined Federal Regulations (CFR) and is granted authority through 
Title 47 of the United States Code (U.S.C.) (FCC, 2010). Title 47 (U.S.C.) Section 
(§) 301 requires licenses for entities to operate radio transmitters and compliance 
with FCC regulations. This would require entities to acquire authorization and 
licenses for the use of any radar UAS detectors, and RF and GPS jamming 
equipment. Title 47 U.S.C. § 302(a) prohibits the sale and use of devices that 
interfere with radio reception. Similarly, Title 47 U.S.C. § 333 prohibits 
maliciously or willfully interfering with any radio communications with a licensed 
station. This would directly preclude the sale and use of applicable RF and GPS 
jamming and spoofing operations. In 2016, a Chinese company was ordered to pay 
over $34 million to the FCC for the sale of signal jammers on their website 
(Rupprecht Law, 2020). The FCC related laws preclude several of the more popular 
interdiction methods commonly used by the federal government to include spoofing 
and jamming.  
Criminal Code 
Small unmanned aircraft are required to register with the Federal Aviation 
Administration (FAA) per Title 14 C.F.R. § 48.15 in which the definition of 
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“aircraft” is adopted from Title 49 U.S.C. § 40102 as “any contrivance invented, 
used, or designed to navigate, or fly in, the air.”  The application of this regulation 
to UAS inherently implies that small UAS are subject to many of the same laws 
that apply to larger manned aircraft. Therefore, any individual or organization that 
interdicts a small UAS may be subject to the same penalties imposed for larger 
manned aircraft. 
Title 18 U.S.C. § 32 prohibits willful disablement, destruction, and damage 
to any aircraft within the jurisdiction of the United States, and carries a hefty fine 
and up to a 20-year prison sentence. This statute bans the use of kinetic, net, 
projectile, and other potentially destructive means of interdicting a small UAS. . 
Additionally, many Title 47 statutes that prevent C-UAS include a reference to Title 
18 statutes, which carry fines or prison sentences as well. Title 18 U.S.C. § 1367 
prohibits the interference with satellite transmissions and carries the penalty of a 
fine and a prison sentence of up to ten years.  
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) 
The FAA established Title 14 C.F.R. § 107 to integrate UAS into the 
National Airspace System (NAS). Part 107 covers registration, certification, and 
operational regulations and procedures required to operate a civil small UAS within 
the U.S. From a legal perspective, an entity that successfully spoofs the UAS link 
and takes control of the aircraft is required to comply with Title 14 C.F.R. § 107. 
This requires a successful spoofer to have appropriate FAA certifications, airspace 
waivers (if applicable), and established a pilot in command for the flight. 
Additionally, the spoofer is responsible for the condition of the aircraft and the 
safety of the remaining flight (Rupprecht Law, 2020). In essence, the spoofer 
becomes completely liable for the aircraft and anything that happens for the 
remainder of the flight. Spoofing has possible additional penalties under Title 49 
U.S.C. § 46308, in which a penalty of fines and up to 5 years imprisonment for a 
person with an intent to interfere with air navigation by interfering with a “true light 
or signal.”   
A 2019 FAA letter to airports reiterates some of the criminal penalties that 
could be leveraged from C-UAS implication and continues to cite some of the 
additional concerns with airport-specific implementation (FAA C-UAS letter to 
airports, 2019). This letter discusses the use of UAS sensors as a potential point of 
contention due to the emissive properties of many of the sensors. For example, 
while audio sensors are typically considered passive, they are typically required to 
be networked to other sensors and processing stations to locate and identify threats 
properly. This is typically through wireless networking between components of the 
system. The FAA letter cites Title 14 C.F.R. § 77 which requires airports to notify 
the FAA for any planned airport alterations and sets standards for determining if 
they cause obstructions to air navigation (FAA C-UAS Letter to Airports, 2019). 
Additionally, the FAA cautions the use of UAS detection systems due to potential 
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unknown effects on the navigational facilities and transmitters (NAVAIDs) used 
by pilots to navigate the national airspace. The letter also cites Title 14 C.F.R. § 
139.333, requiring the protection of NAVAIDs as part of the airport certification 
process. While the FAA acknowledges the potential threat that UAS present, it 
certainly does not condone the casual use of even passive C-UAS technology for 
airports. 
 
Legal C-UAS Implementation 
Several federal entities are allowed to legally conduct C-UAS per public 
law. The National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) FY 2017 allows C-UAS 
implementation to the Department of Energy (DOE) and the Department of Defense 
(DoD). Division H of The FAA Reauthorization Act of 2018, also cited as the 
Preventing Emerging Threats Act of 2018, subsequently grants similar C-UAS 
implementation to the Department of Justice (DOJ) and the Department of 
Homeland Security (DHS). 
Authorized C-UAS Actions 
Both the NDAA 2017 and FAA Reauthorization Act of 2018 use similar 
verbiage to authorize C-UAS actions to the DoD, DOE, DOJ, and DHS. However, 
the context and justifications in which C-UAS actions may be employed differ 
between departments. In general, the DoD and DOE have slightly more freedom to 
execute actions to “mitigate the threat… to the safety or security of a covered 
facility or asset” (NDAA, 2017, pp. 641, 758) when compared with the DHS and 
DOJ actions being limited executing actions to “mitigate a credible threat…to the 
safety or security of a covered facility or asset” (FAA Reauthorization Act of 2018, 
p. 339). All four agencies’ respective Secretaries are required to consult with the 
Secretary of Transportation for implementation of these C-UAS actions. This is 
primarily to mitigate and monitor negative impacts to the National Airspace 
System. The FAA Reauthorization Act of 2018 and the NDAA 2017 list the 
following broad actions permitted for UAS threat mitigation by the DoD, DOE, 
DHS, and DOJ: 
• Detect, identify, monitor and track UAS 
• Warn the UAS operator 
• Disrupt control of the UAS 
• Seize or exercise control of the UAS 
• Use reasonable force to disable, damage, or destroy the UAS 
Permitted DoD and DOE C-UAS Justifications 
 The primary difference between each of the respective agencies' ability to 
conduct C-UAS lies in how a ‘covered facility or asset’ is defined for each agency. 
Each of the respective agencies’ secretary can define a covered asset or facility 
within the scope of the agency’s responsibilities and under broad guidelines 
outlined in legislation. The NDAA 2017 (p. 759) defines a covered facility or asset 
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for the DOE as one which is owned by the United States and is used to store or use 
special nuclear material. Essentially, nuclear facilities are covered and the DOE can 
take the listed actions above to protect these facilities. 
 The DoD’s ‘covered facility or asset’ is one that the Secretary of Defense 
identifies, is within the United States (or territories), and relates to the DoD’s 
nuclear deterrence mission, missile defense mission, or national security space 
mission NDAA 2017 (p. 642). It is important to note that these restrictions apply 
only within the United States, and there are tactical guidelines to dispatch unwanted 
UAVs in combat situations. These provisions allow the DoD to continue strategic 
missions and deal with potential UAS threats appropriately. 
Permitted DOJ and DHS C-UAS Justifications and Additional Restrictions 
 The DOJ and DHS have more restrictions and additional requirements 
placed upon them for C-UAS activities as outlined in the FAA Reauthorization Act 
of 2018 when compared to the DOE and DoD, likely due to the immediate gravity 
of possible consequences from unmitigated UAS threats from the ‘covered facilities 
or assets’ overseen by the DOE and DoD. Both the DOJ and DHS are authorized 
to take the common C-UAS actions for National Special Security Events and 
Special Event Assessment Rating events, at the request of the Governor for a 
specific time and specific event, and to protect active Federal law enforcement 
investigations, emergency response, or security functions that are also limited for a 
specific time and event (FAA Reauthorization Act of 2018, p. 344). 
 The DOJ is also permitted to take C-UAS action to protect the President of 
the United States and Attorney General, as well as federal detention centers, 
correctional facilities, and buildings, to include courts, that are owned or operated 
by the DOJ. The U.S. Marshals Service is somewhat unique in that it is specifically 
listed to protect certain persons instead of ‘facilities or assets’ and can take C-UAS 
action to protect “Federal jurists, court officers, witnesses and other threatened 
persons in the interest of justice” (FAA Reauthorization Act of 2018, p. 344). The 
U.S. Attorney General recently published department guidance on the 
implementation of this Act, describing the processes in which covered facilities will 
be identified, required risk-based assessments, and other measures designed to 
preserve  First and  Fourth Amendment rights (Barr, 2020). 
 The DHS has several other justifications for taking C-UAS action that are 
separate from the shared justifications with the DOJ. The DHS is authorized to use 
C-UAS actions for security and protection functions related to U.S. Customs and 
Border Protection, Secret Service protection operations, and to protect buildings 
and facilities occupied or secured by the Federal Government (FAA 
Reauthorization Act of 2018, p. 344). 
 The United States Coast Guard (USCG) falls under the purview of the DHS 
but has unique justifications for authorized use of C-UAS actions and is separately 
mentioned in the FAA Reauthorization Act of 2018. The ‘covered facility’ for the 
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USCG is one that is under the administrative control of the Commandant USCG or 
a vessel or aircraft that is involved in a USCG mission. The USCG may execute C-
UAS actions involving a mission escorting or assisting a DoD vessel, other high 
value or high personnel vessels, to protect the POTUS and VPOTUS, as well as in 
search and rescue operations (FAA Reauthorization Act of 2018, p. 347).  








Table 2      
Federal C-UAS Authorized 
Activity     
  Department 














Facility, asset, or persons 
identified by the Attorney 
General (DOJ) or Secretary of 
Homeland Security (DHS) as 
high-risk and a potential target 
of unlawful unmanned aircraft 
activity  
Facility under control 
of the Commandant or 
a vessel or aircraft 
operated by, assisted 
by, or otherwise 
involved in a mission 
with the USCG 
Location Located within the United States or one of its territories 














or use of 
nuclear 
material 
1) National Security Special 
Event 
2) Special Event Assessment 
Rating 
3) At the request of a Governor           
4) Protect active Federal 
investigation 
 
1) Assistance or escort 
mission for DoD 
2) Assistance or escort 
mission for a vessel of 
national security 
significance, or a high 
interest, capacity, or 
value vessel 
3) Protection of the 
POTUS and VPOTUS 
4) National Security 
Special Event 
5) Special Event 
Assessment Rating 
6) Air Defense of US 










7) Protection of 
correctional 
facilities, courts, 















Note. United States Coast Guard (USCG) falls under DHS but has separate 
grounds and authorized C-UAS justifications  
 
 
In addition to the necessary coordination with the Department of 
Transportation and the FAA for all C-UAS activities, both the DOJ and DHS have 
additional requirements and restrictions placed upon them. Both departments are 
required to “establish research, testing, training on, and evaluation of” equipment 
used for C-UAS before its implementation in the field (FAA Reauthorization Act 
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of 2018, p. 340). Other restrictions on the two departments include civil privacy 
protections to preserve First and Fourth Amendment rights. Both the DOJ and DHS 
are only allowed to keep electronic communications and data regarding C-UAS 
actions for up to 180 days and are prohibited from sharing such information outside 
of their respective departments unless the Secretary of Homeland Security or 
Attorney General determines that the information is necessary for prosecution or 
purposes of ongoing litigation (some exclusions apply to both of these rules). 
Additionally, semi-annual briefings are required to appropriate Congressional 
subcommittees regarding any previously mentioned exclusions and activities 




C-UAS implementation and policy are still in the early stages within the 
United States. As the UAS threat becomes more prevalent, reliable and accessible 
C-UAS options will need to be available to public agencies and private industry 
most at risk for drone threats. For this industry to mature, performance standards 
and testing metrics will need to be developed and adopted that pose minimal 
adverse effects to the National Airspace System. Once standards are set, new legal 
definitions can be applied to the equipment in use for manufacturer compliance, 
and implementation by non-federal entities. The required DHS and DOJ research 
and testing, coupled with the required semi-annual briefings to the appropriate 
Congressional committees, may serve as a responsible way to gather insights and 
data for wider C-UAS adoption. New legal definitions may be needed for UAS to 
prevent the hefty penalties that may be imposed for their interdiction.  
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